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Abstract
This thesis is a reflection of my general interests in intra-partisan elec-
toral conflict. Empirically, my study is motivated by Aaron King’s (2017)
theory about the relationship between announcement timing in U.S. Senate
primary contests and experience in the arena of federal elections. I develop
a measure that credits candidates with the highest score if they are an in-
cumbent Senator, then three lower scores ranging from higher office to no
experience. I then examine how this measure relates to the timing of candi-
dacy announcements inside nine upcoming Republican primary contests for
U.S. Senate nominations. I test two, tentative hypotheses about how these
measures fit together across all of the data I have gathered, and find some
support for one of them. However, my thesis is largely inductive, embracing
the aim of explaining the contexts of both recent trends in Republican party
primary politics – the present (2018) election’s Bannon insurgency and the
pre-Trump era’s Tea Party activity.
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1 Introduction
Being a member of a political party does not always come with security. Candi-
dates face challenges from within their own party, whether they are an incumbent
or seeking office for the first time. Within Republican politics, the primary process
became more focused and energized when the Tea Party movement emerged as a
dominant voice in 2010. This movement supported numerous candidates in pri-
mary elections to oust sitting incumbents and other centrist politicians. The move-
ment witnessed mixed results, but certainly created memorable conflict within the
party.
In the 2016 primary elections, the presence and endorsements of Tea Party
groups declined, and the movement largely fell in line with the Trump presidential
campaign. However, Steve Bannon is the leader and instigator of a conservative,
Tea Party revival in the 2018 Republican primaries. Bannon served as the White
House chief strategist and was the executive chair of conservative leaning Briet-
bart News. Towards the end of 2017, he expressed determination to run his own
slate of insurgent candidates by creating a donor network. No one is safe, he said
in interview (Bradner 2017). Thus far, he has recruited about ten Senate can-
didates in states with a centrist, Republican incumbent or vulnerable incumbent
Democrat.
Tea Party and Bannon-backed candidates were willing to go against the status
quo and create conflict within their own party. They are undoubtedly ambitious
in their endeavors, given that peripheral movements in major parties are less
influential, as contrasted to party leaders and elites. King wrote that candidates
for U.S. Senate need tremendous momentum and resources to gain recognition
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from the electorate, much less become elected (2017: 23). In this thesis, I set out to
determine if Tea Party and Bannon-backed insurgents are living up to that demand
by examining when they enter a Senate primary race. Literature has established
that candidates for the Senate increase their chances by entering a race early
and competing for money and endorsements before another candidate does. With
rewards like these attached to the timing of announcement, ambitious candidates
must act accordingly and wisely should they be a serious contender. While this
holds true, candidates must also account for their level of political prowess and
base their choice of when to enter the Senate race off of how experienced they are
on the campaign.
The two qualities of experience and timing bear significance in the campaign,
and this study will examine the relationship between the two among previous Tea
Party candidates and current 2018 candidates. Within this rationale, my first
research question asks if there is a relationship between a Tea Party candidate’s
level of political experience and the timing of their announcement. The second
question expands by asking if there is a relationship between Republican primary
candidates’ political experience and their time of announcement in select states
that Steve Bannon is influencing. Both political experience and the timing of
candidacy are integral issues to a campaign for the Senate and I hope to detail
the presence or absence of a relationship among the two classes of candidates.
To determine the existence of a relationship between the two characteristics, I
draw from Aaron King’s theory that political experience and timing of announce-
ment are related to one another. In King’s work, he theorizes that the more
experienced will announce earlier, and the less experienced will announce later.
He does give consideration and evidence that certain circumstances will cause the
opposite, but that most candidates will follow that trend. I developed two hy-
potheses to test how these measures fit together across the experience levels and
announcement times of 2010-2016 Tea Party candidates and 2018 Republican Sen-
ate candidates. The findings indicate support for both hypotheses, with stronger
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support found among the pool of Tea Party candidates.
Starting with Chapter Two, I define what Tea Party movements are and the
main goals and characteristics of the movement while also providing literature
concerning why the primary election is the arena for this conflict. In Chapter
Three, the theoretical basis is expanded upon and the reasoning for the expected
relationship is further explained in the context of political experience. Chapter
Four provides the research methods and way in which timing of announcement is
obtained. Chapter Five fulfills two roles: first, I describe the Tea Party’s activity in
four election years and how the movement fared holistically. Secondly, an analysis
of each state Bannon threatened is provided, along with the experience levels and
time scores for all 2018 candidates. Chapter Six provides an overview of the data
with an analysis of the findings from Tea Party candidates and those candidates in
the 2018 elections. Lastly, Chapter Seven concludes with suggestions for further
research and broader implications.
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2 Defining the Tea Party and Far Right Movements
Late in 2009, an excellent opportunity for outburst presented itself. CNBC re-
porter Rick Santelli lamented the new Obama administration’s foreclosure relief
plan in a rant that went on air. He exclaimed, ”The government is rewarding
bad behavior” with regard to a minor homeowner bailout plan (Perlberg 2014).
While Santelli was not a politician, he declared the concerns of many citizens who
would later partake in the Tea Party movement. The rant was an important part
of starting the Tea Party tidal wave and the clip rapidly scaled the media tower.
The clip caused such a fuss that White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs had
to address it, which inflamed the issue even more. Soon after, a movement that
symbolizes “American Patriotism“ would be born as a resistance to the direction
of the country and Republican party. This section will seek to introduce the Tea
Party and detail its conflict within the G.O.P.
2.1 Characteristics in the Tea Party
Although the Tea Party struggled in the past few years and saw its role change
with the introduction of candidate and later nominee President Trump, recent
studies describe the movement as the most important base within the Republican
Party (Foley 2012). Even when the Tea Party suffered widespread losses in the
2014 midterms, they still retained their influence in the party. Throughout much
of 2015, the Tea Party aligned House members and conservative Freedom Caucus
members caused trouble in John Boehner’s Republican agenda, so much that he
frequently relied on Democratic votes to pass legislation. By forcing Boehner’s
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hand enough times and disrupting the House, they wrestled control of his own
caucus away from him and forced his resignation from office (Bash 2015). The Tea
Party and other far-right causes may never win the White House, but they remain
active enough to disrupt mainstream Republican goals and present themselves as
a transformative voice within the party.
A source of conflict in the Tea Party literature is that Republicans fear GOP
safe seats are in harm’s way when a far-right challenger achieves victory in a
Republican primary. This occurred several times early in the Tea Party movement,
such as Sharon Angle’s victory in the 2010 Nevada GOP primary, but loss to former
Sen. Harry Reid. Richard Murdock during the 2012 Indiana Senate election is
another example. He won the GOP nomination, but made incendiary comments
about rape culture and lost to Democrat Joe Donnelly. The Republican Party
was suffering from intra-party fighting that was costing them seats they could
otherwise win in the U.S. Senate. Oppositely, there are victories for the Tea
Party, such as Dave Brat’s 2014 victory over Eric Cantor in one of Virginia’s
Congressional primaries (Hood, Kidd, and Morris 2015). These are just a few
instances that drive mainstream Republicans and their donors in an endeavor to
squash and fight off challenges from the right.
There is also scholarship published concerning where the Tea Party belongs.
They levied an all-out war with mainstream Republican lawmakers during their
intense period of 2010 to 2014, but still maintained a Republican identification.
Professors David E. Campbell and Robert D. Putnam found that the most dis-
tinct and powerful characteristic of a Tea Party supporter is their Republican
identification (2011). Democracy Corp found that 86% of Tea Party supporters
and activists identify or lean to the Republican Party. (Greenburg 2010). The
people that become involved are often not political newcomers and neophytes, but
they were most likely to call government officials and be involved before the Tea
Party made headlines with their 2010 victories. They were already highly parti-
san Republicans, and “whatever their concern about particular Republican elites,
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Tea Party participants are right-wingers in a GOP orbit“ (Skopol and Williamson
2012).
We can firmly establish that Tea Party supporters are Republicans and con-
servative, but what makes them different from “the establishment“? What pushes
them to the point of declaring intra-party war? “Establishment Republicans“
can be used to refer to any Republican that does not identify with the Tea Party
movement. Both groups align over the same issues in a “most important problem“
index. Both groups see the economy and jobs as the most significant problem, and
all other categories are equal. Essentially, the priorities for each group mirror one
another (Hood, Kidd, and Morris 2015: 929). What makes them so different to
warrant internal party fighting? The approaches taken to address problems is
where differences begin to surface. To combat the problem of the federal budget,
Tea Party supporters are more willing to cut spending than their Establishment
counterparts, while both groups are staunchly opposed to increasing taxes. There
are also two ordinal level measures that provide an angle from which the two groups
differ, which are ideology and party identification. In Hood and McKee’s survey
sample, 69% of Tea Party supporters identify as “very conservative,“ whereas only
41.6% of Establishment Republicans fall in that category. Along party lines, 69%
percent of Tea Party supporters are a “strong Republican,“ whereas 53.6% of Es-
tablishment Republicans fall in that category. Although the two measures are
ordinal levels, this gives a picture of how the two groups differ at the surface level.
2.2 Tea Party and Primary Elections
In the U.S., we maintain a two-party system. However, other nations can have
up to five major parties that hold seats in their legislative body, such as Germany
and France. To differentiate, the U.S. governance and design of the Electoral Col-
lege does not bode well for any third-party movement. In U.S. Senate elections,
the party primaries take precedence. In the U.S. presidential elections, party pri-
maries take precedence. In Germany, the far-right party Alternate for Germany
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(AfD) currently holds 92 seats in the Bundestag, the German parliament. Simi-
larly, the French nationalist party National Front maintains 18 seats in the French
parliament. The American Tea Party, however, does not have the same mobility.
This lack of mobility to live and breathe on its own, independently, is one
reason the Tea Party is a Republican movement. They mirror the major goals of
the Republican Party, such as jobs and the economy and share other demographic
attributes (Hood, Kidd, and Morris 2015: 930). However, to achieve the goals that
are distinct from the Republican Party, working within the party as a transforma-
tive force is their only option. If the Tea Party were to branch out and begin a
third-party movement, it would likely be met with more hostility and misfortune.
The movement is more than a simple “rebranding“ act (Foley 2012; Skopol and
Williamson 2012: 76), but it is carefully coordinated movement to dramatically
change the people and ways of the Republican Party.
Given the overview of the Tea Party’s key differences and relationship to the
Republican Party, we can establish a connection between them and the Republican
primary system. Movements can gain attention. They can propagate. They can
receive airtime, money, and persuade others of their ideas. But, all these actions
are not the pinnacle of the movement. The pinnacle of the movement is to achieve
change. Such change happens when individuals are placed in an environment in
which they have the power to enact their preferences and wishes into public policy.
Since the Tea Party is confined to the Republican Party, they must compete within
this setting. Hood writes: “There is little question that the principal institutional
mechanism for the exercise of the Tea Party influence on national politics (and
the Republican Party) is through the primary ballot“ (2015: 927). If they do not
have the ability to win primary elections or cannot win them at all, they lack the
ability to influence the Republican Party. Therefore, the Tea Party and Bannon’s
insurgents must compete in this setting.
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3 Theory
The major theory and expectations develop from Aaron King’s work, Unfolding
Ambition in Senate Primary Elections. Writ-large, the author uses the timing of a
candidate’s announcement as the measure of ambition for the U.S. Senate. When
the 114th Congress began in January 2015, all Senators up for re-election in 2016
already knew whether they intended to seek re-election or seek other plans. Many
moving parts occur during the course of a campaign, and wise timing is required
to catch the parts needed for ambition to come to fruition. However, strategic
timing is not a silver bullet for success, as many politicians well timed their entry
into a race and lost. King writes: “it is important to note strategically timing
candidacy decisions will not always lead to a victory; rather, it is an attempt
to maximize the probability of success“ (84). Candidates with high degrees of
political experience and those with less experience announce at different times,
but nonetheless, their experience is intersecting with the time at which they enter
a race. That intersectionality is central to this thesis and its attention to the Tea
Party and 2018 elections.
3.1 Importance of Announcement Time
Benefits accompany declaring for a race at an early date. When a candidate is
interested in higher office, they assess resources, influence, cash-on-hand, and any
other source that could boost their chances of election. To the candidate’s detri-
ment, the resources available are not continuous and decline with each passing
day (King 2017: 24). A candidate most needs money, organizational staff, and
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endorsements. The longer a candidate prolongs announcing the campaign, the
less likely of a chance they have in dipping into those key resources. King found
that political fundraising is strongly correlated with a candidate’s decision to an-
nounce candidacy (87). Fundraising is often key to running a successful campaign,
and King found that candidates who declare their candidacy earlier receive more
money. The time at which one enters a race is tied to several key variables which
increase the likelihood of success. Second to increasing the odds of oneself winning,
they are decreasing the odds that more opponents would emerge. If a candidate
enters a race and generates funds and attention immediately, they could deter
others who would run if that candidate were otherwise absent (Goodliffe 2001).
In King’s work and for the purposes of this project, the timing announcement
is not alone. In an examination of the Tea Party and Bannon candidates, the
announcement decision will intersect with the candidate’s level of political ex-
perience. While declaring at an earlier rate will provide a higher likelihood of
resource gathering, candidates vary on their announcement time when their level
of political experience is assessed.
3.2 Importance of Political Experience
The second quality under consideration is political experience. Seasoned candi-
dates are often much more capable of running a successful campaign and winning
elections (King 2017). Incumbents and statewide elected officials are adept at
fundraising and generating the attention a Senate campaign needs, whereas state
politicians and local officeholders lack the name recognition and the funds to
maintain as great of a likelihood for success. King writes, “Differences in elec-
toral experience lead potential candidates to have asymmetric influence over one
another. Using this information, one can make predictions about when certain
individuals will announce their candidacy decisions“ (23). Political experience
also contributes to a candidate’s profile they maintain with voters. Politicians
and voters are often most familiar with the office that a candidate currently holds
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or their most significant public office prior to running for the Senate (King 2017:
64). This most recent office held will suggest when a candidate should announce.
High quality candidates, such as incumbents and statewide office holders, have an
incentive to enter a race early and ward off other candidates. Oppositely, lower
level candidates should delay their announcement to increase their likelihood of
winning. They cannot compete for resources with politicians that are more well-
known and can better see the full slate of candidates if they declare closer to the
filing deadline (King 2017: 89).
Some candidates for Senate do not amass as much political experience. They
are known as low-quality candidates. Ideally, they should decide early since they
are not well known and hold less resources. However, they generally wait. They
hold less resources and must use them sparingly. By delaying a choice, low-quality
candidates are increasing their upward mobility. While others declare for the Sen-
ate, they often are vacating offices. This provides time for a low experience candi-
date to scout his options and take the low hanging fruit if deemed more desirable
and achievable than a Senate seat. While they are ambitious for the Senate, that
ambition can often spill over into other offices. Additionally, low-quality candi-
dates have more uncertainty with less funds and lower name recognition. While
entering a race early is the overall best option, candidates lack a high degree of
certainty because the full display of candidates has yet to form. By announc-
ing later, low-quality candidates trim the level of uncertainty by knowing their
competition.
The timing of the 2018 primary candidates’ announcements relative to their
experience is central to the discussion of this thesis. However, experience does
not give a full description and its drawbacks are duly noted. First, sometimes
the political climate disregards and despises experience. In 2010’s Tea Party wave
and during the 2016 presidential campaign, experience was not valued and voters
lost confidence in a politician’s institutional insight. Secondly, qualifications can
increase the chances of winning, but a candidate’s visibility must come first. Most
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candidates get recognized because they are known, not because of their qualifica-
tions (Fenno, 1978). The 1978 Democratic primary for New Jersey’s Senate seat
illustrates this. Richard Leone served as the appointed New Jersey state treasurer
and managed two governor’s campaigns. Overall, he was a top scholar in the state
concerning finance and had the resume to prove it. He was a high-quality candi-
date, with regard to experience. However, Bill Bradley was also in the race. He
was a Rhodes Scholar and played in the NBA with the Knicks, which usually does
not fit with politics. To the contrary, his pre-political activities gave him visibility
and attractiveness that Leone could not attain. In the end, Bradley bested Leone
61% - 21%. Thus, candidate’s decision timing will be evaluated alongside their
political experience, but some candidate’s also have the ability to achieve a style
of “stardom,“ whether or not they are famous.
The two research questions I asked from Chapter One directly relate to these
two qualities: a candidate’s political experience and the time at which they an-
nounce their candidacy. Two hypotheses that deal with these variables will be
presented as pertaining to the Tea Party candidates from 2010-2016 and the cur-
rent states in which Steve Bannon has endorsed a candidate.
3.3 Tea Party Candidates’ Political Experience and Timing of An-
nouncement
Tea Party candidates entered into politics with strong ambition to primary long-
time Republican incumbents and other centrist candidates out of political office.
Gauging from the rhetoric and money that influenced their campaigns, Tea Party
candidates appear to have a great deal of enthusiasm to reach the Senate (Skopol
and Williamson 2012, Foley 2012). In this project, the timing at which a candidate
declares for a Senate race (i.e. earlier or later) is a reflection of that ambition.
The first research question asked if there exists a relationship between a Tea Party
member’s political experience and the time at which they announce their candi-
dacy. Political experience is expressed in two different manners. The first is
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concerning the level of political experience they most recently held. The second
express is the total number of years they have in political experience, whether that
be elected or unelected experience. By expressing the independent variable in two
forms, I am able to see where a candidate is politically, and how much quan-
tifiable experience they have. Those questions are rationalized in the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1a: As Tea Party candidates’ most previous political ex-
perience increases, their timing of announcement will decrease, or be
earlier in the timeline.
Hypothesis 1b: As Tea Party candidates’ years of political experience
increases, their timing of announcement decreases, or becomes earlier.
3.4 Select states with Bannon’s candidates: Political Experience and
Timing
The second research question dealt with how Steve Bannon’s candidates were
affecting the campaigns in select states during the 2018 midterms. Bannon’s can-
didates are in races that have an adversary, either in the form of an incumbent
Republican or a vulnerable Democrat. Since a Bannon candidate is present in
several races, I hypothesize that this will cause an effect of political experience to
correlate with the time of announcement by seeing experience increase by timing
of announcement decrease. A serious contender with Bannon and far right sup-
port could trigger other candidates to announce their candidacy at an early rate to
compete for attention and resources, or they may wait to see how Bannon’s can-
didate will fare in the campaign and form a more certain view of the playing field.
Political experience is expressed in the two same way as in the first hypotheses.
The second set of hypotheses with regard to the 2018 Republican Senate primaries
are listed below.
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Hypothesis 2a: As 2018 Republicans’ political experience increases,
their timing of announcement decreases, becomes earlier.
Hypothesis 2b: As 2018 Republicans’ years of political experience in-
crease, their timing of announcement decreases, or becomes earlier.
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4 Research methods
4.1 Candidate’s Timing
Political experience is treated as the independent variable (X) and the timing of
announcement is treated as the dependent variable (Y) across all hypotheses. For
both, political experience is expressed in two different ways. First, experience is
expressed as an ordinal rank level measure based on the candidates most previ-
ously held office. The chart below lists the ranks.
Table 1: Levels of Candidate Experience
Level of Experience Description
Incumbent Currently holds the Senate seat
High Currently or previously held U.S. House,
governor, Lt. governor,
or statewide office
Low Currently or previously held state Senate,
state House or local office
None Never held elected office
The second expression of political experience is obtained by figuring the can-
didate’s total years of political experience. Initially, the variable was based on
solely elected office experience, but candidates can also boost their image and
name recognition by working in jobs that are not elected offices. For example,
many candidates lack an elected office, but are well known from chairing a presi-
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dential campaign or being heavily involved with the state Republican Party. So,
the variable includes any years of political experience that could potentially aid
in the recognition of a campaign.
The dependent variable for both hypotheses is expressed as the timing of can-
didacy announcement. The complexity in obtaining this score is that each state
regulates elections differently, especially regarding the filing deadline. For exam-
ple, some states conduct a primary in March, whereas the most common primary
occurs in June. Additionally, some states maintain a distinct filing period. This
means that a candidate may announce for office at any given time, but they may
only officially file during a two-week period.
Several factors are incorporated when determining the candidate’s decision
timing. First, January 1 of the year prior to the election year is the beginning
of the timeline. For example, the beginning of the timeline for the 2018 primary
elections is January 1, 2017. The only pitfall with setting the beginning date in
this manner is that some candidates make a choice about their campaign before
that time. For example, Roger Wicker of Mississippi filed for his 2018 bid in
2013. However, in King’s examination of 611 primary elections over a twenty-year
period, 97% of decisions were made after January 1 of the year prior to the election
year (2017). A very small number fell outside of that and a uniform variable is
needed to compare each candidate’s timing of entry into the race. On the other
hand, the end of the timeline is the filing deadline for the primary. Most deadlines
fall around late March and early April of the year the election will take place.
So, after acquiring the filing deadline for each state under consideration by
scouring state secretary of state websites and news articles, I located the time
at which the candidate announced the campaign. This involved contacting some
candidates directly, searching the news, and searching records kept by state par-
ties. When that date is obtained, I assigned each candidate a score between zero
and one-hundred. A candidate with a score of 0 filed for election on the first day
it was made available, or in Mr. Wicker’s case, before January 1 of the preceding
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Figure 1: Timing Calculation
year. A candidate that filed for election on the filing deadline would receive a
100. And a candidate that filed halfway between the two dates gets a score of
50. All candidates received this figure and were placed on a timeline with all the
other candidates in their respective primary. While simplifying the date of entry
to a standardized variable, it could detract from the environment of each state,
as filing dates are almost never the same. However, having a standardized vari-
able provides a way to quickly compare the differences in two or more candidates,
especially when the experience level is viewed alongside it. The numerical value
for each date is obtained using a date-to-number tool R Studio produces. Then
the beginning date is subtracted from the decision-making date. The bottom of
the fraction is the beginning date subtracted from the filing deadline. Using the
numerical values for the dates yields a value between 0 and 1, which effectively
represents how far along was the candidate’s decision was in the overall timeline.
4.2 Correlation and Measurement
Two correlations were obtained for each hypothesis. In the first correlation for Hy-
pothesis 1, the independent variable of political experience is expressed in ranks
of 1) No experience, 2) Low quality, 3) High quality, 4) Incumbency. It was then
correlated with the announcement times for all Tea Party candidates from 2010
to 2016. A Spearman’s Rho non-parametric correlation was used to measure the
strength of association between the two variables and the direction of the variables.
In the second correlation for Hypothesis 1, political experience was still utilized as
the independent variable, but instead of using an ordinal level scale to determine
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experience, years of political experience were used and correlated with the same
data for Tea Party announcement times. A Pearson’s correlation was used since
both the variables were interval for the second correlation of Hypothesis 1. Sec-
ondly, the data for select 2018 midterm states with a Bannon candidate’s presence
was correlated to determine the variable’s strength of association for Hypothesis 2.
In this correlation, 2018 Republican primary candidates’ political experience was
expressed in ordinal level ranks identical to the ranks in first hypothesis. These
measurements were then correlated with the 2018 candidates’ announcement times
using a Spearman’s Rho correlation. In the second correlation, political experi-
ence was alternatively expressed as years of political experience and correlated
with 2018 candidates announcement times using a Pearson’s correlation, since
both independent and dependent variables are interval in this correlation.
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5 Electoral History of the Tea Party and State-by-State Anal-
ysis of Bannon Candidates
After examining the characteristics and environment for Tea Party candidates,
this section will detail the record of Tea Party candidates in their Senate elections
from 2010 to 2016 and provide a state-by-state view of all the candidates declared
for nine states and ten elections in which Steve Bannon threatened the status quo.
5.1 Tea Party Victories and Loses for the Senate in Recent Elections
5.1.1 2010
Although the Republicans gained control of the House in the 2010 midterms, they
did not gain control of the Senate in that cycle. Understandably, the Senate is
a much more difficult chamber to undergo partisan change, and sometimes takes
two to three cycles to change the majority. However, this does not negate the
loses the Tea Party endured in that cycle. On the one hand, Tea Party endorsed
candidates performed wonderfully in the primaries; of the nine candidates in the
2010 Senate cycle, only one candidate lost in the primary. However, only four
of the candidates managed to win in the general election. The primary victories
were enough to keep the momentum going into the next cycle, but also enough
for Republicans to doubt Tea Party candidates’ electability to the Senate.
5.1.2 2012
With the enthusiasm heading into the 2012 cycle, Tea Party groups supported
more candidates. To the contrary of their ambition, many candidates lost in the
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primary or simply did not win against the Democratic opponent. For example,
establishment candidates with better name recognition were defeated in Michigan
and Wisconsin in their respective primaries and Dan Liljenquist lost to Senator
Orin Hatch in the Utah primary. As for candidates that won their respective
primaries, many of them experienced defeat in the general due to harsh rhetoric
or missteps during the campaign. Todd Akin became infamous for his suggestion
that victims of “legitimate rape“ rarely became pregnant (qtd. in Moore 2012).
Richard Mourdock started strong in Indiana by defeating an incumbent in the pri-
mary but fumbled by saying that God intends for rape to happen (Groer 2012).
On the other hand, the Tea Party victories in this cycle were enough for the move-
ment to stay alive, most notably with Ted Cruz’s defeat of the Texas Lieutenant
Governor, which all but sealed his victory in the midterm. Other victories include
Jeff Flake, who would ultimately deviate away from the Tea Party in years to
come, and Debbie Fischer.
5.1.3 2014
The 2014 cycle was the most interesting in terms of shifts from the two previ-
ous election cycles. A strong, well-coordinated response from the establishment
wing of the Republican Party held off many “insurgent“ candidates, such as Chris
McDaniel of Mississippi, Joe Carr of Tennessee, and Mark Bevin of Kentucky.
In addition, the types of races also changed. In the two previous cycles, Tea
Party movements tried challenging incumbent Republicans in primary elections
and Democrats in general elections. They were met with more failure than suc-
cess. While the challenges to incumbents in 2014 were still met with dismal results,
other candidates did, in fact, win races and go to Washington. In six key races, Tea
Party movements supported candidates that lacked an incumbent in the primary
or there was a Democratic incumbent in the general that was now in a red-turned
state. For example, the Tea Party contributed to Tom Cotton’s bid for Senate in
Arkansas. Arkansas, along with the rest of the South, had moved in a conservative
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direction and any Republican that would challenge David Pryor would win. The
Tea Party saw an opportunity with least resistance to support a conservative can-
didate and did so. Likewise, Dan Sullivan of Alaska received Tea Party support
and defeated incumbent Senator Mark Begich in the general election. These two
races featured an incumbent, but Tea Party groups perceived an easier race, given
that a Republican incumbent was absent the Republican primary.
A telling race is seen in Ben Sasse’s Senate campaign in 2014. Mike Johanns
announced he would not seek reelection, which made the seat open for both pri-
maries. Sasse received an endorsement from the Tea Party Express, and his main
challenger, Shane Osborn, initially received support from FreedomWorks. How-
ever, when Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell endorsed Osborn, Free-
domWorks pulled their support and gave it to Sasse, instead (Fox 2014). This
dynamic is representative of two observations. First, after the Tea Party fared
better in races in which there was no powerful, establishment Republican. Sec-
ondly, the fundraising dynamic between Ben Sasse and Shannon Osborn shows
that the Tea Party is not one, holistic movement that is centralized. Rather, the
Tea Party is more akin to a spider web, that is spread out with no organization
that routes back to a central authority (Foyle 2012).
5.1.4 2016
The 2016 cycle illustrated the Tea Party’s declining power and absorption into
the changing scene of presidential politics. Only four credible candidates cam-
paigned as Tea Party candidates: Kelli Ward (AZ), Sharron Angle (NV), John
Flemming (LA), and Marlin Stutzman (IN). These four were defeated in the pri-
maries, pointing to this cycle’s absence of the Tea Party and realization that the
“establishment“ Republicans were meeting them in tight races. Several other Tea
Party candidates entered the 2016 primaries, but they were incumbents who were
supported by the Tea Party in the 2010 election. In this race especially, conser-
vative candidates with no experience entered Senate races. In addition, the Tea
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Party was, by circumstance, absorbed into the Trump campaign in 2016 as the
Republican Party organized behind him.
The Tea Party impacted Republican politics to such a degree that it eventually
elicited a reaction (Kane 2016). The campaign to “crush the Tea Party” as Mitch
McConnell put it was highly successful in 2014 by keeping their candidates from
winning primaries. While the Tea Party suffered losses, it did learn from its
previous cycles to support open and semi-open races, which helped deliver six
candidates to the U.S. Senate. Through the movement’s losses and successes, it
was still a collection of different Tea Party movements, the structure was never
centralized but was spread out like a spider web (Foley 2012). Interestingly enough,
the Tea Party still maintained a voice at the grassroots and fundraising levels while
the two sometimes maintained different goals and candidate preferences.
5.2 Select States and Steve Bannon’s Candidates
This section will explore the dynamics of eight Republican primaries that lead up
to the 2018 midterms. In each section, the candidates are given their decision
scores and evaluated based on their level of experience. Additionally, some races
feature a retirement, which creates a different type of environment as contrasted
to that of an incumbent-present race. The state analysis helps to see each state’s
circumstance. Trends do exist, but state environments help to verify those trends,
or give good reason as to why frameworks may not work across multiple states.
5.2.1 Alabama
Jeff Session’s appointment to the Department of Justice created a vacancy in
the Senate. To fill that seat, a special election was set for December 12, 2017.
Interestingly, Alabama law mandates party primaries to occur for their special
elections. It was originally slated to coincide with the state’s regularly scheduled
election in 2018 by former Governor Robert Bentley. However, Governor Kay
Ivey rescheduled the general election for December 12, 2017 and established the
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primaries on August 15, 2017, and the primary runoffs on September 26, 2017.
The election in discussion is a special election, but there are key elements of
Republican politics. First, the Republican primary featured significant competi-
tion between three high-quality candidates. Ideally, more high-quality candidates
with ambition for the Senate could have entered (King, 2017). 2017 was not an
election year, so they would have nothing to lose save for being away from the desk
of their current office. Secondly, a breakdown in Republican politics presented it-
self. Although three candidates in the primary were high-quality candidates, they
each appeal to different coalitions and have different styles of presentation. These
coalitions and preferences include moderate Republicanism, Tea Party sentiment,
and politics of resisting, which is most notably attached to Roy Moore. The third
aspect of the race is the appeal to President Trump, which is an observed variable
across all Republican primaries in this thesis. Although the election is decided,
certain aspects are akin to the 2018 primary elections and can serve as a point
reference.
In Alabama’s primary, ten Republicans qualified. Four of the candidates have
elected office experience that varies from high-quality to low-quality, and the other
six have never held office. Most notably, Mo Brooks is currently a U.S. House
member from Alabama. In his 2010 entry to the House and the special election
in question, he was a Tea Party favored candidate (Seitz-Wald, 2017). Oppo-
sitely, Luther strange was appointed to the seat by Bentley and was flanked for
being a career politician and establishment Republican. He ran unsuccessfully
for Lieutenant Governor and was later elected as Attorney General. The third
candidate in the race was Roy Moore. With regard to Tea Party and far-right
conservative support, Brooks and Moore maintained shares of both coalitions, but
Moore retains an audience through his defiance, which makes the Alabama race
truly unique. He unsuccessfully ran for governor and was twice-removed from the
federal bench. In addition to removal, he maintains a preference of Christianity
directing public policy
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Since the election was special, the beginning date of the timeline is set at the
selection of Jeff Sessions for Attorney General (Johnson, 2016). Even though a
candidate could not officially file at this point, beginning the time here is logical,
since they could announce a campaign on that date. Thus, the start date is
November 18, 2017 and the filing deadline for the primary is May 17, 2017. Below
is a table that lists candidates experience levels with their timing scores.
Table 2: Alabama Senate
Candidate Level of Experience Time Score
Luther Strange Incumbent 10
Roy Moore High 88
Mo Brooks High 99
Trip Pittman Low 100
Randy Brinson None 88
Mary Maxwell None 99
James Beretta None 88
Dom Gentile None 96
Bryan Peeples None 99
Joseph Breault None 86
In this race, the candidate largely followed expectation, with less experi-
enced candidates delaying their announcements. Of the higher-quality candidates,
Luther Strange was the only candidate to announce immediately after Sessions’
appointment. Interestingly, Brooks and Moore were both delayed, despite their
experience. At the time, Roy Moore was being removed from his post as Chief
Justice by the Alabama Judiciary, and Mo Brooks may have speculated, since
he knowingly entered a race with two well-know politicians. The largest mystery
when examining the time data is that Luther Strange announced very early in the
race, about a month before Bentley picked him as the appointee. Candidates enter
races at certain times to maximize the probability of success (King, 2017). For
Strange’s case, entering early, even before Bentley considered him, was the best
choice he could have made, as he fundraised quickly. However, certain decisions
on the campaign are not guaranteed to deliver a winning result, but the timing of
a decision should maximize the utility they currently possess that will place them
closer to winning than otherwise.
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In the end, Strange and Moore advanced to the runoff, with Moore earning
39% to Strange’s 33%. In the runoff, Moore again bested Strange 55%–45%. Even
throughout the campaign, Moore consistently commanded a 10-point lead (Tal-
fragar Group). Although Strange announced early and lost, he likely maximized
his resources by announcing early – which could explain why Bentley picked him
as the appointee.
The last analysis of Alabama’s Senate election is the presence of President
Trump. During the primary, candidates were accusing each other of insufficient
loyalty to Trump, and casting themselves as the true Trump supporter. Since
Trump won Alabama nearly 2-1, candidates must appeal to this. However, Al-
abama disrupts this assumption. Trump endorsed both Strange and Moore, but
his endorsements were not the victors. This may not exist as the best example,
since Moore placed himself in a sexual harassment situation and his record of
resisting the federal government earned him popularity. If a presidential endorse-
ment falters in a deep-red state, this could spell disaster for candidates in swing
states that earn the president’s support. Again, Alabama’s Senate election illus-
trates that expectations concerning decision timing and presidential endorsement
will not always accomplish victory, but are purposed to maximize a candidate’s
utility.
5.2.2 Arizona
Arizona’s Senate race is one of the most interesting and exciting races this midterm
season. Not only will the Republican primary generate energy, but the general
election features a strong, current Democratic House member. In addition, Ari-
zona is not a one-party state. Both of its state parties are healthy and nominate
strong contenders for federal elections. Currently, the state is in Republican hands.
Since the 1990’s, the state has remained in Republican hands, for the most part.
John McCain has held a seat in the Senate since 1987 and the House delegation
remains red. Yet, the state of Arizona gave its electoral votes to Barrack Obama
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in 2008 and 2012. In 2016, the state gave its votes to Donald Trump, but only
by a margin of 3.5%. Therefore, Republicans that compete in primary elections
must be wary that a strong Democratic challenger often waits for November.
The Arizona Senate race was also complicated by Sen. Jeff Flake’s retirement.
After publicly clashing with Trump on many votes and fundamentals of Republi-
canism, Flake announced his retirement. Not only would he have faced a difficult
election by running against Democrat Kyrsten Sinema in the general election, but
he was polling poorly against far-right candidate Kelli Ward after clashing with
Trump. The timing of his retirement announcement is suggestive of an interest
in maintaining the majority his party currently maintains (King, 2017), and he is
also rumored as a 2020 candidate against Trump. However, the retirement opened
the door to a larger and more energetic field.
Although the race is open, the breakdown of far-right and centrist Republi-
canism is still existent. Kelli Ward was the first candidate to announce. She is
a doctor and former state Senator who takes Tea Party positions. Since she re-
cently ran the 2016 primary election against John McCain, she benefits greatly
from name recognition (OH Predictive Insights). The most energetic installment
of the race is Joe Arpaio. Arpaio has been tagged, “America’s toughest sher-
iff“ by ramping up immigration enforcement. Most notably, he established the
“tent cities“ to house unauthorized immigrants and performed sweeps to round
up immigrants and hand them over to Immigration Customs and Enforcement.
Additionally, Arpaio was convicted of criminal contempt for disobeying an order
to stop detaining immigrants due to lack of legal status. Trump later pardoned
him in August 2017. In 2016, Arpaio lost his re-election as sheriff in Maricopa
County, which is Phoenix and suburbs, while Trump won Maricopa County.
Lastly, Martha McSally currently serves as the House member for Arizona’s
second Congressional district. Notably, she was the first female fighter pilot in the
U.S. military. She is generally noted as a centrist Republican, but has rhetorically
stepped to the right, by telling the Republican Party to “grow a pair of ovaries“
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and to stop “dicking around“ (Weaver 2018) concerning immigration policy. Since
increased negative rhetoric increases with primaries, this is not surprising, espe-
cially considering her far-right competition. She has become more open to Trump
from the onset of her announcement, despite not supporting him in 2016. Below
is a chart that lists the current candidates for the Arizona Republican primary
and the dates they announced their candidacy.
Table 3: Arizona Senate
Candidate Level of Experience Time Score
Martha McSally High 73
Joe Arpaio Low 72
Kelli Ward Low 0
Craig Brittain None 52
Christian Diegel None 61
Michelle Griffin None 56
Nicholas Tutora None 42
The most notable time score of the table is Kelli Ward, which indicates that
she announced before January 1, 2017. Soon after she lost to John McCain in
2016’s primary, she announced her bid for another Senate run. To the contrary of
how most low-quality candidates behave, Ward announced very early. This is a
clear indication that she is ambitious in her goal of becoming a Senator. Although
she is less experienced politically, she maintained funds and high name recognition
from her previous election. When she announced for this Senate race, she did so
under the impression that she would compete against Jeff Flake. Quite oppositely,
Flake announced his retirement. By taking a gamble as a low-quality candidate
and throwing her hat in early, she elevated her status as a prime competitor for
the seat against Martha McSally and Joe Arpaio. In addition, she benefits from
the media attention. For example, she was the principle far-right challenger before
the race began and has equal media attention as compared to McSally and Arpaio.
In doing so, she differentiated herself from other low-quality and low experience
candidates that announced later.
In relation to the timeline, McSally announced her race late. As a high-quality
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candidate, this move was not in her best interest, especially when a far-right chal-
lenger announced so quickly and Joe Arpaio announced slightly before her, as well.
However, there is candidate strategy that triumphs over her late announcement.
John McCain received a brain cancer diagnosis in 2017, which naturally leads to
speculation of a retirement before his term is up. McSally likely delayed entrance
into the race so that she could announce for John McCain’s seat if he were to
resign. Running in a special election with her major Republican competition and
the strongest Arizona Democrat, Kyrsten Sinema, already in the other Senate
race would provide an easier route to the Senate. However, the deadline is May
30 and a McSally’s decision already fell at 73% along the timeline. Even though
high-quality candidates usually declare early, this case provides a compelling ex-
ample that candidates are also considering alternation options and delay making
a commitment to explore or wait on those opportunities.
Retirements are also key to understanding Senate primaries, especially if they
happen during the middle of a decision timeline and are unexpected. Flake was
suffering in matchups that projected him against Ward in the primary and Sinema
in the general. Subsequently, he left the race. Yet, retirements affect high-
quality candidates more than low-quality candidates (King, 2017). In this case,
Joe Arpaio, Kelli Ward, and other low-quality candidates will have a long shot
whether or not the seat was open. However, the Flake’s retirement gave McSally
more certainty. Since she is giving up her current House seat to pursue the Senate
seat, minimizing uncertainty is important. Typically, more candidates announce
when a seat becomes open, and more candidates may continue to step forward
before the May 30 filing deadline.
In addition, just because retirements cause chaos in the election does not mean
they are without purpose. Flake understood that his feud with Trump would
not bode well with Arizona voters, but his retirement was early in the timeline.
Retiring early lessens speculation and helps the retiring member’s party to recruit
a candidate who would win. In Flake’s case, his early retirement is meant to
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help his party, but also the faction of his party. High-quality candidates will not
usually leave their current station unless they have good reason. In this election,
McSally and any other high-quality candidate after her will have good reason to
announce. By giving a high-quality candidate the ability, this could disrupt the
forecast of far-right candidates Ward and Arpaio and could potentially spit their
conservative vote share.
5.2.3 Mississippi
Mississippi and Arizona are undoubtedly the most energetic races of the 2018
midterms. Four years ago, a clear Republican divide existed in Mississippi pol-
itics between mainstream Republicans and Tea Party groups. In the midterm
election of 2014, this divide manifested itself in the form of state Senator Chris
McDaniel challenging Thad Cochran in the Republican primary. Chris McDaniel
lost that race narrowly, thanks to African American communities that voted for
Thad Cochran in the runoff (Hood and McKee, 2017). Despite that race is four
years in the past, the angst is still fresh in many voters’ minds and the drama of
this state’s midterms took a turn when Thad Cochran announced his retirement
from the chamber in March (Stolburg 2018).
Mississippi is regularly scheduled to hold its Senate election for 2018, and Thad
Cochran’s seat was not scheduled until 2020. However, Cochran announced in
March that his resignation from the Senate would be April 1 due to complications
in health. In this scenario, a special election must be scheduled along with the
regularly scheduled election. In this analysis of candidate strategy and Senate
races, there are two separate Senate races, but they are very much intertwined
into one ordeal.
Mississippi was prepared to witness a competitive primary season before Thad
Cochran announced retirement. Beforehand, incumbent Roger Wicker filed and
essentially announced his bid for re-election in 2013, immediately after he won his
2012 campaign. In addition to making his re-election ambitions known before the
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timeline began, Wicker engaged in behavior that is intended to deter competi-
tion. For example, he announced the support of 65 Mississippi Trump Campaign
heads and touted an endorsement from Donald Trump. Another example is a poll
he commissioned. The poll was conducted by Glen Bloger with Public Opinion
Strategies. In that poll, Wicker was projected to beat Chris McDaniel among
favorability, a head-to-head matchup, and among Tea Party supporters. However,
the poll mentioned a name recognition variable concerning McDaniel at 78%, but
no such figure was associated with Wicker.
The absence of Wicker’s name recognition in the poll is no surprise. He likely
maintains less name recognition than McDaniel for two reasons. One is that
Wicker’s hometown is Tupelo, MS. He represented the area in the state legisla-
ture, and in the U.S. House of Representatives. He is known throughout northern
Mississippi but lacks the name recognition in the central and southern parts of the
state. In those regions, McDaniel maintains high name recognition, especially near
his hometown, Ellisville, MS. Secondly, Wicker falls in line with most Mississippi
Senators; he was appointed and has never faced a competitive primary or elec-
tion. Thus, he never truly campaigned statewide as he was re-elected in primary
and general elections by comfortable margins. Therefore, Wicker makes credible
threats with his record and endorsements to keep a challenger at home and save
resources. However, McDaniel is an apparent threat in Mississippi because he
nearly won a Senate seat held by Thad Cochran.
Since McDaniel lost his first Senate bid, his PAC, “Remember Mississippi“
remained active and McDaniel himself casually dropped hints on his social media
outlets of ambition to seek a higher office. Initially, he announced a candidacy
decision against Roger Wicker in Mississippi’s regularly scheduled election. Com-
ically, Cochran announced his retirement shortly after McDaniel entered Wicker’s
race. With the retirement comes an appointment from the governor to fill the re-
mainder of Cochran’s term, and that appointee is usually expected to campaign in
the special election to follow. In a quick turn of events, McDaniel switched races
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before the governor named Cindy Hyde-Smith to fill Cochran’s seat. Although
this is the messiest Senate race of all the state’s in this thesis, the turn of events
sheds light on the strategy and tactics that candidates often employ, whether they
are the incumbent or on the outside looking in.
Both of Mississippi’s Senators drew positive utility from their strategy. In
Wicker’s scenario, he advertised his endorsement from the President and carefully
chose poll information released by his campaign. In addition, his status allowed
him to arrange multiple fundraisers with the goal of “shoring up his campaign
account“ (Harrison 2017). In addition to Wicker’s strategy, Cochran also employed
smart planning of his retirement. The filing deadline for the regularly scheduled
race was on March 1, 2018. Chris McDaniel filed for election on February 28, only
one day out from the deadline. In a quick turn of events, Cochran announced his
retirement a week later, after McDaniel declared against Wicker. Strategically,
Cochran tied McDaniel’s hands and placing pressure on him should he choose to
switch from Wicker’s race to the open seat race. The same scenario happened in
Arizona. For a high-quality candidate, Martha McSally delayed an announcement
73% into the timeline as she waited to see if John McCain would retire. The same
strategy was unfolding in McDaniel’s mind. Cochran’s health was in question
and he wanted the low-hanging fruit of an open seat Senate election. However,
Cochran’s strategic retirement effectively tied McDaniel’s hands.
The regularly scheduled Senate primary contains Roger Wicker and Richard
Boyanton, a southern Mississippi businessman. On the other hand, the special seat
is a nonpartisan election in which the top two candidates enter a runoff if none
receive a majority. To replace Cochran, the governor of Mississippi appointed
Agriculture Commissioner Cindy Hyde-Smith. Immediately after the retirement,
Mike Espy announced his high interest in the seat, and Chris McDaniel switched
to the race prior to Hyde-Smith’s appointment. Additionally, Tupelo mayor Jason
Shelton entered the race. All these candidates and any others that enter before
April 24 will compete in the same election. Although the race under consideration
36
is a special election, open seat elections gather more candidates and feature more
potential candidates than elections with an incumbent presence (King, 2017).
Although McDaniel nearly defeated Cochran in 2014, an open election is a lower
hanging fruit that can save a campaign money and resources. Here are two charts
that provide time scores for each Senate candidate in both elections. They are
separate, but dependent of one another, especially given McDaniel’s ambition for
higher office.
Table 4: Mississippi Senate
Candidate Level of Experience Time Score
Roger Wicker Incumbent 0
Chris McDaniel Low 100
Richard Boyanton None 95
Table 5: Mississippi Senate Special
Candidate Level of Experience Time Score
Cindy Hyde-Smith Incumbent 32
Chris McDaniel Low 18
Mike Espy High 0
Jason Shelton Low 58
Using a timeline for the special election involves setting the beginning of the
timeline on March 5, which is when Cochran announced retirement. The end date
is established as April 24. Compared to other regularly scheduled races, the time-
line is significantly shorter, but serves to illustrate McDaniel’s strategic ambition
for the Senate. His score of 18 represents a quick change of heart that placed
him in this race. Additionally, he announced transition before Hyde-Smith was
announced as the replacement. By acting in this manner, he established presence
early on and made himself the threshold that any further announce candidate
must defeat. In addition, open seat elections are more crowded than elections
with incumbents. Furthermore, special seat open elections are potentially more
problematic because they are nonpartisan. Candidates only need the highest or
second highest percentage to compete in a runoff. Therefore, a lower threshold
could draw candidates into a race.
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5.2.4 Nebraska
Deb Fischer is seeking her second term in the U.S. Senate. When she sought
her first term in 2012, she aligned herself with the Tea Party by receiving an
endorsement from conservative donor Club for Growth. Despite her conservative
endorsements and positions, she was a target for Steve Bannon when he sought
to oust incumbents from high office (Bradner 2017). Her situation is suggestive
of many ultra-conservative voters’ perceptions of lawmakers that are elected to
federal office, regardless of Tea Party support prior to their swearing-in. While
anti-Fischer sentiment does exist within the state, a high-quality challenger did
not step forward into the primary pool. The most serious challenger to primary
her is Todd Watson, only because he ran against Ben Sasse as an independent
in 2014. Demographically, she is relatively safe against any challenger. Donald
Trump won approximately 60% of Nebraska in the 2016 and Fischer voted with
his agenda and preferences at a high rate.
Although she is safe, the anti-establishment angst directed towards her early in
the timeline is suggestive of key features concerning the Tea Party movement. One
feature is that the Tea Party itself has no official spokesman to the degree that the
major political parties do. In fact, the Tea Party is symbolic of a spider web, in
which no centralized point exists, but each connection bears weight (Foley, 2012).
Upon Steve Bannon’s removal from the administration, he selected members of
Congress to target in the 2018 midterms. Deb Fischer made that list. However,
she was a Tea Party candidate in her 2012 election. Bannon’s targeting of her
campaign is illustrative of the idea that the Tea Party and far-right campaigns
are not focused into specific goals and that any recognized figure can speak for
the movement. Thus said, no high-quality candidate entered the race. In addition
to Fischer’s financial campaign history, the Nebraska GOP chair said finding a
candidate more conservative than Fischer would prove difficult.
In addition, Fisher took steps to front her campaign. Often, incumbents do
not host an official announcement, like a challenger commonly does. They usually
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decide on re-election long in advance and it is an assumption that they will run.
By proofing her campaign early in the timeline, Fischer potentially reaffirmed her
commitment to her state and deterred any would-be challenger with high name
recognition. Below is a chart with the candidates. The filing deadline was on the
first day of March.
Table 6: Nebraska Senate
Candidate Level of Experience Time Score
Deb Fischer Incumbent 41
Jack Heidel None 91
Dennis F. Macek None 98
Jeffrey Lynn Stein None 97
Todd Watson None 77
Gathering the conservative credentials to best Fischer would be difficult, as
best. Her record with Tea Party support and President Trump’s endorsement
makes a primary challenge all the more difficult. To sum, her early entry and
an announcement event cemented her lead in the primary, and likely the general
election.
5.2.5 Nevada
Nevada is the only midterm election with an incumbent Republican Senator in a
state Hillary Clinton won. The state is generally a toss-up state for all elections, as
voters elected George W. Bush twice, and Barrack Obama twice. Dean Heller is the
incumbent senator and was viewed as the Republican’s most at-risk senator. Heller
became noticeable in the Senate when the health care debate ensued, especially
after he voted against a repeal measure of the Affordable Care Act.
Heller drew one notable primary challenge from Danny Tarkanian, an attorney
who ran for a Nevada Congressional district. In his own regard, Tarkanian is
highly well know in Nevada politics and sports. Often, states feature a Reform
Party candidate that runs in every election and never garners over one percent.
Quite oppositely, Tarkanian has filed to run in seven elections since 2004. In
half the elections, he represented the Republican party in the general election.
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Additionally, Tarkanian was a high school sports star in Nevada and played on his
father’s team for three seasons at University of Nevada Las Vegas. Most recently,
he filed to challenge Dean Heller in the 2018 primary and pledged to more firmly
support Trump.
In most elections Tarkanian entered, he was perceived as the Tea Party candi-
date. If he did not earn Tea Parties’ endorsements or support, he was viewed as
the far-right candidate. In a JMC Analytics Poll from October, Tarkanian beat
Heller 44% to 38%. Additionally, 500 Nevada Republicans gave 85% approval to
Trump and 86% indicated a likeliness to support his endorsement in the primary.
The primary consisted of Tarkanian and Heller, but Trump is effectively on the
ballot in this primary, as well. During the health care debate to repeal the Afford-
able Care Act, Heller voted “No“ against two versions of the repeal and replace
measures. In doing so, he drew the ire of the President. He received a threat that
continued “No“ votes would cost him re-election in Nevada. Sensibly, Heller voted
“Yes“ on the “skinny repeal“ that ultimately failed. He also voted to support the
Republican tax plan supported by Trump.
Finding favor with the President led to an endorsement of Heller and a message
to Tarkanian. By tweeting, Trump pushed Tarkanian to exit the Nevada Senate
primary and enter the House seat he most previously sought. While Tarkanian
was perceived as a threat to Heller, he was not projected to fare well against
Jacky Rosen, the Democrat who will likely campaign in the general election. On
the other side of the coin, Heller behaved strategically to earn support among
the President, Nevada Republicans, and Nevada independent or centrist voters.
Voting for the final repeal measure and tax reform measures earned Trump’s sup-
port and endorsement. At the same time, voting “No“ on other health measures
is representative of Heller’s strategy with Nevada voters that voted for Clinton.
Clinton won the state by a two-point margin, and his Senate race may feature
similar numbers. Heller secured Presidential favor and is appealing to moderate
Nevada voters by playing to both sides. While this race is the prime example of
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Presidential influence, the timing and strategy of candidacy decisions also merits
attention.
Table 7: Nevada Senate
Candidate Level of Experience Time Score
Dean Heller Incumbent 0
Danny Tarkanian None 50
Sarah Gazala none 57
Dean Heller is the incumbent in the primary, but similar to Roger Wicker’s
campaign, there was no indication by his office, his campaign, or the media that
a formal announcement was made for his 2018 bid. According to FEC filing
reports, he filed a candidacy statement seven times ranging from September 2013
to October 2017. With each candidacy report, a new fundraising committee was
designated, but there never was an announcement event. In starting his campaign
early, he amassed over seven million dollars, more than any other office seeker in
Nevada. Eventually, his campaign announced on March 9, 2018 that Heller had
filed for re-election. On the other hand, Tarkanian announced his candidacy on
Fox News on August 8, 2017 but never filed. The last candidate in the primary
is Gazala. She is a special needs school teacher in the Las Vegas area. She too,
announced early but did not file until March.
Interestingly, Nevada law only allows permits a candidate to file for a short
period: between the first Monday in March and the second Friday following the
Monday. Even though Tarkanian announced, he never filed due to President
Trump’s insistence. Trump tweeted on the day of the qualifying deadline, March
16, 2018, for Tarkanian to withdraw and enter the House race he most previously
sought in 2016. Even though the timing scores for the candidates align with their
political experience, outside influence from other interested parties changes the
dynamics.
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5.2.6 Tennessee
The resignation of Senator Bob Corker rattled the cage in Tennessee’s Senate race.
Not only has the resignation created a blank space in the Republican primary, but
former governor Phil Bredesen is campaigning on the Democratic side. Here, a
primary candidate must take into account who they will face in the general election
more than ever, given Bredesen’s high name recognition. Having the power to win
the primary is fruitless if the general election is not winnable (Boatright, 2013).
Initially, Tennessee’s open race drew a crowded Republican field and speculation
from the current governor, Bill Haslam. However, the Tennessee Republican Party
significantly winnowed the primary field. Citing bylaws that govern who may seek
the Republican nomination, the party removed seven candidates from the ballot
who did not vote in three of the previous four Republican primaries. As a result,
three Republicans are left in the race and only one maintains significant political
experience. Marsha Blackburn currently represents the Franklin area in the U.S.
House of Representatives. Although her time score is somewhat later for a high-
quality challenger, she strategically waited to see if Haslam would declare for the
seat. Below are the candidates’ announcement times.
Table 8: Tennessee Senate
Candidate Level of Experience Time Score
Marsha Blackburn High 60
Stephen Fincher High 64
Larry Crim None 0
Tommy Hay None 87
Darrell Lynn None 97
Ronaldo Toyos None 65
Aaron Pettigrew None 42
Steven Hughes None 66
Of all Senate primary races in the midterms, Tennessee witnesses the highest
level of candidate interaction and the strategy that follows. Corker did not an-
nounce his retirement until September 26, 2017 (Ebert 2017), which corresponds
to a score of 58. By remaining in the race that late, he forced Fincher and Black-
burn to wait. However, if politicians are truly ambitious they would naturally
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seek an office unhindered by their obstacles and only fueled by ambition. Corker’s
retirement says just the opposite. First, Blackburn and Fincher know they face
an uphill battle if they declared against Corker. At the end of 2017, his FEC re-
ports indicate six million dollars at his disposal. Additionally, he maintains every
advantage of an incumbent. Even though Blackburn and Fincher were ambitious
for the Senate, they could not possibly declare early, no matter their political
experience.
Secondly, this example demonstrates how a candidate’s political experience is
not all-telling and that strategy may not always align with years in office. King
proposes that high-quality candidates should declare early in the timeline as a de-
terrence towards other high-quality candidates (2017). However, if Blackburn and
Fincher declared before Corker’s retirement announcement, they would have pro-
pelled themselves into an uncertain and unstable environment. Granted, getting
the name and candidacy out early is valuable for polling and monetary purposes,
but the interaction with Corker’s retirement suggests candidates value certainty
and stability just as equally.
Tennessee’s race also became heated when Corker second-guessed his retire-
ment for a short period (Everett 2018). Even though Blackburn and Fincher
declared candidacy after Corker announced retirement, this goes to show that
stability is never guaranteed. Initial general election polling revealed Bredesen de-
feating Blackburn by a small margin, which prompted individuals and groups to
court Corker on reconsidering (Collins and Ebert, 2018). If he did enter the race,
he would likely need the President’s support. Yet again, Trump is a player in the
election. In late 2016, harsh rhetoric was exchanged between Corker and Trump,
and Corker subsequently saw his favorability decrease in Tennessee. When Corker
reconsidered retirement, Blackburn’s campaign took steps to increase prominence
and rhetoric. Responding to a potential loss to Bredesen, Blackburn’s campaign
staff said, “Anyone who thinks Marsha Blackburn can’t win in a general election is
just a plain sexist pig“ (Savransky 2018). Additionally, Blackburn commissioned
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polls that provided leads over Corker and Fincher, as well as securing endorsements
from numerous Tennessee politicians. As for Fincher, he withdraws from the race
upon realizing the sizable funding and polling leads Blackburn maintained. When
he withdrew, he publicly suggested for Corker to reverse his choice on retirement.
Concerning Republican dimensions, Blackburn maintains a Tea Party presence
and is unique in the context of this race. Most Tea Party and far-right candidates
are “outsiders looking in”; that is what makes them challengers. However, Black-
burn is currently a sitting House member. To date she is supported by Club for
Growth and the Senate Conservative Fund. She is well received by Trump and
served on his transition team. She is one of few candidates that is endorsed by
Tea Party groups but will not fight for the nomination in the primary. To the
contrary, Bredesen is a well-known opponent despite his political party.
To sum, retirements from the Senate matter tremendously. Blackburn, Fincher,
and Bredesen were and are candidates only because Corker announced retirement.
Therefore, retirements, especially if strategic and not expected, change the slate
of candidates available to a voter on election day. Clearly, Blackburn and Fincher
were ambitious for the Senate because they announced soon after the retirement.
But the retirement cleared any doubts out of mind and amplified their chances of
winning on election day, creating a link between retiring members and optimiza-
tion of opportunity.
5.2.7 Utah
Throughout most elections, Utah voted as a reliably conservative state. Orrin
Hatch was re-elected several times and the Tea Party supported Mike Lee when
he first sought the Senate. Despite Lee’s election, Utah voters maintain a disdain
for nationalism driven politics. In the 2016 presidential election, Trump only won
a plurality, 46%. Part of this stems from Evan McMullen’s presence in Utah.
However, one could argue that Utah’s suspicion of nationalism creates the ideal
environment for a third-party candidate to receive over 20% of the popular vote.
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Utah’s distinct political identity coupled with an open seat election provides an
insight into an interesting state.
Utah uses a unique primary system. Most parties allow qualified candidates to
run in their primary election, and the top two candidates will compete in a run-off
if none gain a majority in the first round. However, Utah’s system is focused on the
convention and signature method. To select the primary candidate for Senate, the
voters caucus and select delegates for a state convention. If a primary candidate
receives 60% of delegate votes, they are the party’s nominee and no primary is
held. If no candidate receives 60%, then the top two candidates will compete on
the primary ballot. There is also an alternative route to getting on the primary
ballot. If a candidate can collect 28,000 signatures, that will automatically place
them on the ballot, regardless of what happens at the convention. Therefore, if
a candidate can gather signatures, they will force a primary if someone at the
convention wins 60% (“How Elections Work in Utah“). When filing for office,
candidates must indicate what channel they will choose, and may pursue both the
convention method and signature method.
Originally, Orrin Hatch said in 2012 that should he win, he would not seek
another term in the Senate. To the contrary, he told the press on March 9, 2017
that he was planning on running in 2018 (Romboy, 2017). Trump wished for him
to continue with a Senate bid, but Hatch ultimately announced his retirement on
January 2, 2018. Some polls indicated that approximately 75% of Utah voters
wished for Hatch to retire, while prefering Romney as the replacement (Davidson,
2017). On the one hand, Hatch retired for fear of losing and on the other, he is 83
years old and fourty-one years in the Senate is almost half a century. Regardless
of what prompted him to retire, the timing of his retirement announcement merits
attention. He announced at 84 percent of the Utah Senate timeline. That is a
very late announcement for an incumbent who is presumably concerned with his
party’s majority status.
Late retirements can serve a purpose. By waiting until the filing deadline is
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closer, a later retirement decision gives the opposition party less time to organize
(King, 2017, 144). But in Utah’s political context, the Democrats are not a threat.
The threat could only come from a challenger with Utah’s Republican Party. No
candidate, even a high-quality candidate like Romney, could have effectively orga-
nized so long as Hatch remained in a race. By delaying retirement, Hatch warded
off the current slate of candidates and game them less time to organize and gather
signatures. Effectively, Hatch made Romney’s entrance into the race easier. Rom-
ney was already rumored to run if Hatch retired. When Romney entered the race,
he usurped the media and attention away from anyone else who would later an-
nounce. Politicians enjoy a stable environment, and Hatch’s late announcement
created instability by delayed the announcements of other Senate hopefuls. How-
ever, whether intentional or not, the retirement announcement timing worked in
Romney’s favor by giving him frontrunner status as soon as he entered.
Table 9: Utah Senate
Candidate Level of Experience Time Score
Orrin Hatch Incumbent 84
Mitt Romney High 94
Mike Kennedy Low 98
Larry Meyers Low 84
Loy Brunson Low 100
Sam Parker None 95
Torrey Jenkins None 100
Tim Jimerez None 88
Jeremy Friedbaum None 99
Stoney Fonua None 99
Alicia Colvin None 98
Jay Hiatt None 84
Joshua Lee None 99
Brian Jenkins None+ 99
Hatch’s retirement generated the most excitement over an open seat, although
most of the candidates have no elected experience. Yet, it shows that individuals
are more likely to set aside the time to file at a courthouse and sometimes pay
a fee. The only serious challenge Romney may encounter is from Mike Kennedy,
who is a member of Utah’s state legislature. Romney commonly receives attacks
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concerning his residence. He was previously the governor of Massachusetts before
the 2012 presidential nomination and has lived in Utah for several years. But most
candidates have used the “he’s not a Utahan“ at some point. Most notably, the
Utah GOP chairman tore into Romney but saying that Romney has not lived his
life in Utah, his kids were not born in Utah, and that he does not shop in Utah.
The attacks do not appear to damage Romney. Romney is the only candidate
to submit 28,000 signatures, which guarantees a spot on the primary ballot. In
addition, he will still take the convention route which permits that 60% of delegate
support will bestow the nomination unless another candidate gets 28,000 signa-
tures (Craft, 2018). Although Romney criticized Trump during the 2016 election,
Trump still extended an endorsement. Demographically, Utah is an ideal state
for Romney’s Senate campaign because he finds favor with the Mormon popu-
lation. Even before he settled to live in Utah, Utahans favored Romney in the
2012 presidential election and he was favored in polls that included Orrin Hatch
and Jennifer Wilson, the Democrat in the race. The most characteristic feature
of this race was the strategic timing of Hatch’s retirement that delayed all other
announcements. Candidates are ambitious for public office, but they are often not
willing to reveal that ambition if the environment is uncertain.
5.2.8 West Virginia
West Virginia is a state won by Donald Trump in 2016 that contains a Demo-
cratic incumbent. As expected, Republicans stepped forward to challenge Joe
Manchin. In doing so, they are representative of primary strategy; candidates are
highly mindful of who they will face in the general election, notwithstanding the
difficulty or ease of the primary phase (King, 2017). West Virginia is known as
“coal country“ and many issues that surround coal drive politics and behavior.
Ultimately, the challengers on the Republican side stepped forward due to the
partisan difference between Manchin and Trump.
The state’s primary has one of the darkest backgrounds of all midterms. In
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2010, the Upper Big Branch mine explosion occurred, killing 29 miners. Massey
Energy was heavily fined for violating safety standards and Don Blankenship, the
then CEO of Massey, was convicted of conspiring to willfully violate safety stan-
dards and sentenced to one year in jail. Prior to that, he established a PAC to oust
a sitting WV Supreme Court justice and elect one that would be more favorable
to Massey’s cases. He purchased justices and then tried to buy a legislature. He
broke the backs of unions and destroyed their contracts. He started the “war on
coal“ narrative and is in part responsible for the Republican shift in West Virginia
(Brown and Bowlin, 2018). John Grisham wrote a book about West Virginia’s
political drama, titled The Appeal. The coal industry has a dark and sometimes
horrifying history. Blankenship arguably represents every negative aspect of the
story and he is currently seeking the high office of Senator.
The two other significant candidates in the race are Evan Jenkins and Patrick
Morrisey. Jenkins is currently a U.S. House member from West Virginia and was a
Democrat until 2013. Morrisey is the state’s attorney general. Throughout much
of the race, these two candidates have exchanged fire towards each other, while
not criticizing Blankenship. Blankenship recently missed a financial disclosure
deadline (Robillard, 2018), so the exact amount of funds available is unknown,
but likely plentiful. Both Morrisey and Jenkins commissioned polls showing their
own self in the lead, with Blankenship two points behind. They are likely unwilling
to directly attack Blankenship over fear that he would receive more attention and
thereby contrast himself as the outsider and the other two as “establishment.“ In
West Virginia’s Senate race, a set of candidates are high-quality challengers and
others that served and participated in politics are low-quality or unexperienced
candidates.
Except for one, candidates lacking experience are announcing in the latter
half of the timeline. Oppositely, Morrisey and Jenkins announced early relative
to their competitors. For them, they each announced early out of necessity to
appeal to Trump and closely align their record with his. Concerning unexperienced
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Table 10: West Virginia Senate
Candidate Level of Experience Time Score
Evan Jenkins High 32
Patrick Morrisey High 49
Don Blankenship None 85
Tom Willis None 94
Bo Copley None 31
Jack NewBrough None 68
candidates, Blankenship is an exception to the standard. Most unexperienced
politicians are without significant campaign funds and lack the name recognition
to barely achieve 1% in an election. However, some of these candidates are wealthy
and able to blare attack ads. Sometimes, they are well-known in business or
a sphere outside of politics. Nonetheless, these candidates can pose a credible
threat to the mainstream political order. Look no further than the White House.
5.2.9 Wyoming
At one point in Wyoming, Steve Bannon was calling for a challenger to incumbent
John Barrasso. The only two candidates that received any attention from him
or the media were Erik Prince and Foster Friess. Prince was a Navy SEAL and
is the founder of a government security and service firm called Academi. More
importantly, he is Betsy DeVos’ brother. Friess is a businessman and large donor
to Christian causes. To date, neither stepped forward as a challenger and Barrasso
is the only Republican in the primary unless another candidate joins by June 5,
2018.
There is a challenger, even though he is not running in the Republican primary.
Dave Dodson is a former CEO for a Jackson, Wyoming based company and an
adjunct professor at the Stanford School of Business. On his campaign website,
he argues that the primary system only exists as a way to protect incumbents.
Therefore, he argues, he must force Barrasso to campaign statewide in the general
election to keep his chances from getting smashed by party bosses within the GOP
(Dodson, 2018). Currently, Dodson has a website and is largely able to self-finance
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his campaign; he said on record he can provide one million dollars and potentially
more (Dovere, 2018). In the chart, Barrasso and Dodson’s timeline score are listed,
despite Dodson’s absence in the primary.
Table 11: Wyoming Senate
Candidate Level of Experience Time Score
John Barrasso Incumbent 0
Dave Dodson(I) None 80
50
6 Data and Analysis
6.1 Difference of Means
Before I delve into the data and framework that deal with the hypotheses, I want
to give an overview of the two variables on a comparison level. Starting with
Tea Party candidates from 2010-2016, Figure 2 shows a difference of means test
between a candidate’s most previous political experience and the timing of an-
nouncement. Incumbents have the earliest average of candidacy announcements,
with the subsequent categories becoming later into the overall timeline. This figure
therefore gives evidence of higher political experience translating into an earlier
entry into a race for the Senate.
Figure 2: Average Announcement Rates in the Tea Party Primaries by Experience
It should also be noted that a one-way ANOVA analysis gives more validity
to the relationship in the graph by providing a significant F statistic of 5.522 at
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significance of .002 p-value. The next chart, Figure 3, shows the same difference
of means results for 2018 Republican candidates.
Figure 3: Average Announcement Rates in the 2018 Primaries
The only unexpected outcome in Figure 3 is that on average, high quality can-
didates declared later than low quality candidates among Republicans in select
states. An ANOVA analysis provides a significant F statistic of 6.301 at a sig-
nificance of .001 p-value. Since the high quality candidates were later than low
quality candidates, there is a possibility that Bannon-fuel activity and retiring
members are keeping candidates across all levels from announcing earlier.
6.2 Hypotheses Concerning Tea Party Candidates
Hypothesis 1a: As Tea Party candidates’ most previous political ex-
perience increases, their timing of announcement will decrease, or be
earlier in the timeline.
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Figure 4: Timing and Political Experience in the Tea Party Primaries
In my hypothesis, I estimated that as a Tea Party candidate becomes more
politically experienced, their timing of announcement will be earlier in the time-
line, or decrease. The independent variable, political experience, is expressed as as
the category of the most previous office held, as described in Table 1. The Spear-
man’s Rho analysis reveals a significant correlation between the two variables, in
line with my hypothesis with a coefficient value of -.392 and p-value of less than
.001 in a 0.01 confidence interval. From this data, we can say that Tea Party
candidates from 2010 to 2016 made their announcement earlier if they previously
held a statewide office or were an incumbent; and made their choices later if they
lacked experience or previously served at the state or local level. Accordingly,
these candidates behaved with ambition in mind, since high quality candidates
are suggested to announce early and lower quality candidates later (King 2017:
29).
Hypothesis 1b: As Tea Party candidates’ years of political experience
increases, their timing of announcement decreases, or becomes earlier.
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Figure 5: Timing and Years of Experience in the Tea Party Primary Efforts
I was interested in this specific hypothesis because the number of years is more
fixed than the ordinal level scale in hypothesis 1a. So this different expression in
the independent variable tells me how much experience, and not just where they
are politically. After using a Pearson’s analysis to correlate the two variables, a
negative correlation of - .458 was yielded. The coefficient is significant at the .01
confidence interval with a p-value of .001. Hypothesis 1b then stands, as timing
of announcements is decreasing (becoming earlier) as political years increase.
Gauging from the coefficient, years of political experience seem to be the better
measure of when candidates declare for the Senate. First, the independent vari-
able was defined as more inclusive than only elected office. This variable includes
any political behavior that could be conducive to a candidate’s name recognition.
Some candidates in the data set had no elected experience but maintained several
years of campaign experience. On the other hand, years of experience could be
misleading. Politicians usually do not spend fifteen or twenty years in one low
quality office. The are often progressively ambitious (King 2017: 10, Boatright
2013: 52). Public office is established as a pyramid with high quality offices near
the top. So, high quality candidates may be hidden within the candidates that
have the most years of political experience.
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6.3 Hypotheses Concerning 2018 Republican Candidates
Hypothesis 2a: As 2018 Republicans’ political experience increases,
their timing of announcement decreases, becomes earlier.
Figure 6: Timing and Political Experience in the 2018 Primaries
This hypothesis estimates that timing of announcement will decrease, or be
earlier, as political experience on the four-level scale increases. A correlation of -
.345 was yielded after correlating the variables using a Spearman’s Rho test. The
coefficient is significant at the .01 confidence interval and p-value of .001. This
suggests that Republican candidates in Bannon threat-level races are declaring
for candidacy with regard to their level of experience as outlined by King. The
the only difference in Hypothesis 1a is that the correlation is weaker when among
all Republican candidates, which gives evidence that candidates could be more
hesitant with regard to the primary threat. Due to the presence of candidates in
2018 midterms who have no experience and waited until the filing day to announce
(score of 100), I did not expect to find that level of coefficient.
Hypothesis 2b: As 2018 Republicans’ years of political experience in-
crease, their timing of announcement decreases, or becomes earlier.
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Figure 7: Timing and Years of Experience in the 2018 Primaries
This hypothesis projected that candidates with more years of experience will
announce sooner. Pearson’s correlation yielded a -.268 coefficient with a .05 confi-
dence interval with a p-value of .014. As in the previous hypothesis, this coefficient
does not correlate as strongly as its political years counterpart in Hypothesis 1b.
The correlation shows that the hypothesis is true and that more years of experience
leads to an earlier announcement. But, the correlation could again be weaker due
to Bannon’s threats and retiring members. The slope of the fit line in the figure is
slightly negative and heavily dotted on the low experience, late entry area. This
is likely due to many candidates in the 2018 select states that file for office on the
last day. Candidates of this nature commonly outnumber serious candidates and
their later entry only pushes the overall timeline back. In addition, there may not
be enough candidates announced in the 2018 Republican primaries to make up for
the high number of “100“ score candidates that enter into races.
In addition, an area of further research with regard to this hypothesis is the
retirements of sitting senators. The Senate races in Utah, Tennessee, Mississippi,
and Arizona were all affected by a retirement or the potential of a retirement. The
final two hypotheses may not have correlated as strongly due to the uncertainty
an incumbent creates when retirement is a possibility.
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7 Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis was to determine if political experience correlated with
a candidate’s timing of a candidacy announcement. By itself, an announcement
decision is just another news article, but that point in a campaign is capable
of setting the pace for the remainder of the trail. Strategically, candidates that
want more funds and better chances of success will announce earlier, but some
candidates do not. Given that not all candidates announce at a common time,
and that more experienced candidates should announce earlier and lower quality
candidates should announce later, I was interested to know if this idea held true
in far right, Tea Party conservative politics of the pre-Trump era and of today’s
Bannon-backed candidates. This thesis began by tracing the Tea Party’s electoral
history across a six-year period. In doing so, the Tea Party impacted Republican
politics by using the primary election as its principle mechanism. While the can-
didates they ran were often met with defeat, their demand for change within the
party and its candidates elicited a response from mainstream Republican leaders
and the movement also generated a competition and conflict.
Overall, the Tea party generated great feats of energy and was a driving force
within Republican politics for some time, as they took back the House and were a
constant antagonizing group in primary elections. Through all of the momentum,
however, the Tea Party was never a unified force within American politics and
was often separated into several large organizations that were conservative at the
end of the day, but largely spoke for themselves. Approval and electability sharply
decreased in 2014, and the large Tea Party organizations hardly fielded candidates
in 2016.
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In the past year, Steve Bannon has promised that no candidate is safe and
that he is willing to primary centrist Republicans and use his candidates to oust
vulnerable Democrats. Taking into account his threats and far right thread that
continues with him, select state from 2018 were also examined along with elections
from Tea Party elections.
The variables examined in the work are qualities that are central to a candidate
and the chances of election. After a lengthy analysis of the Tea Party midterms
and the upcoming midterms, I observed how important money and resources are
to any movement. Large groups financed the Tea Party during the movement’s
energetic period and Steve Bannon recently pushed for more conservative individ-
uals to step forward. Ambitious individuals must step forward, and I discovered
through the literature that the time at which a candidate announces his campaign
is highly important. Furthermore, I was interested in testing the correlation of
experience on ambition. Through the gathering of several datasets and research
on individual conservative politicians, I tested the idea that political experience
will dictate when a candidate announces a run for the Senate, or to put it direc-
tional, that candidates’ timing of announcement will decrease (earlier entry) as
their experience increases.
I found that political experience negatively correlated with the timing of an-
nouncement during the Tea Party’s strong midterm elections, and also currently
as we look to the 2018 midterm elections. In addition to the hypotheses that
stood, I also saw other angles of American politics that likely had an effect on
my thesis. One such effect is that of retiring members of the Senate. Candidates
want an easy way to the Senate and waiting to see who will retire is important,
but also slows down the entire process by pushing announcement times towards
100. Potential candidates often waited until the incumbent announced retirement
before they would announce for the open seat. Strategic retirements are definitely
an avenue for further research as it relates to ambitious individuals that seek the
Senate and other high office.
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This research project touched on several areas of conservative politics and
the ambition that propels people to those goals and allowed for a few simple
assumptions to receive much deeper attention and research, from mapping out a
candidacy timeline to learning about individual office seekers. Although adding to
the work on candidate assessment and Tea Party history was never the goal of this
project, the conclusion that political experience does impact when an ambitious
individual makes herself know to the public may help to encourage others to think
about elections and the impact they have on us. Regardless, the desires of far right
groups in America, like Steve Bannon, pose a thought provoking juxtaposition to
the idea of compromise that many legislators and citizens value, and the contrast
becomes an more salient topic considering where we are politically as a nation.
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